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Extremism and Neo-Liberal Education Policy: A Contextual Critique of 
the Trojan Horse Affair in Birmingham Schools 
James Arthur 
Abstract 
This paper offers new insights into the effects of neo-liberal education policies on some 
Muslim majority schools in Birmingham. It critically reveals how the implementation of neo-
liberal education policies, pursued by both Labour and Conservative Governments, has 
contributed to the failure of some mechanisms of school leadership and governance. The 
move away from agreed collective public and civil values to individualistic and private 
values as the guiding principles of public education has produced confusion in role, function 
and relationships. This is considered within the context in which secular liberal education 
aims to allow different minorities to flourish and recreate themselves. The paper outlines how 
the State has entered more fully into the lives of children and families through limitless 
government regulations and how OFSTED appears open to political interference by 
government regularly changing the framework for inspectors to suit the latest priority. 
Accordingly, the judgements of OFSTED have become contestable especially as the 
framework becomes the means through which every aspect of school life is to be considered, 
including ‘extremism’. 
Contexts 
In March 2014 there was an alleged plot contained in a leaked document, called the ‘Trojan 
Horse’ letter, by so called hard-line Islamists to take over some Birmingham schools. This led 
to multiple formal investigations and emergency inspections of the schools thought to be 
identified in the letter (Rogers, 2014). There are a number of contexts that need to be 
understood to make sense of the many reports into the ‘Trojan Horse’ affair in Birmingham 
schools. The first investigation was commissioned by the Secretary of State for Education 
and led by Peter Clarke – a police officer and former head of the Counter Terrorist Command 
at London Metropolitan Police.  The second investigation was commissioned by Birmingham 
City Council and led by Ian Kershaw – a former head teacher. Both these reports together 
with twenty-one OFSTED inspection reports and a report of the Education Funding Agency 
led to a national debate concerning a group of Muslim teachers, school governors, education 
consultants and educational activists allegedly pursuing what has been described as an 
Islamic fundamentalist educational agenda. However, it is perhaps also important in any 
contextual critique to examine the neo-liberal education policy employed by successive 
governments and the Government’s use of the inspection regime to examine the part these 
have played in contributing to the current anxieties that led to policies of combatting 
‘extremism’ in schools.   
The article firstly critiques neoliberal education policy in England and offers an 
understanding of ‘extremism’ and ‘radicalisation’. There has been a deliberate government 
policy of weakening the power of local authorities in favour of the de-regulation of schools 
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together with unintentionally encouraging culturally conservative Muslim male leaders with 
entrepreneurial values effectively to run public schools as private institutions. Both these 
policies have contributed much to the malpractice found and to the suspicions of ‘extremism’ 
attributed to the governor leaders of these schools by the press and others. Secondly, it 
proceeds to understand the context of the Muslim community in Birmingham and the ‘Trojan 
Horse’ affair through the analysis of the investigation reports and 21 OFSTED inspection 
reports (1). Thirdly, the introduction of British values and the new inspection regime 
priorities is considered before a conclusion is offered.   
The Neo-Liberal Restructuring of Schools 
The Neo-liberal movement in education is an ideological project that seeks to re-define the 
purpose of public education provision. It is recognised at the outset that there is no single 
conceptualisation of neo-liberalism. Neo-liberalism is often employed in the pejorative sense 
by progressives and used vaguely in education discussions. There is huge disagreement over 
the effects of neo-liberal policies in education but more centrally there is disagreement about 
the nature of neo-liberalism (Gerwitz, 2002; Hursh, 2005; and Ball, 2012). The concept has 
different meanings to different observers in different contexts. It is important to highlight that 
some have advocated ‘school self-improvement’ and ‘school autonomy’ and view these 
moves as a way of teachers having more control over the functioning of schools – escaping 
bureaucratic control. Townsend (1996) for example, would not necessarily associate such 
moves as endorsing neo-liberal policies in education. Nevertheless, whilst the concept is fluid 
it is associated with certain identifiable educational ideas and practices which can be 
described as follows.   
It could be said that neo-liberalism focuses on autonomy and choice transforming some 
public goods into private goods. Both Conservative and Labour governments have followed a 
neo-liberal approach in education policy since the 1980s effectively revising the post 1944 
education settlement. This revision of the settlement was accelerated under the Coalition 
Government’s free school reforms. Through the neo-liberal lens our understanding of 
schooling becomes narrowly construed; it is less liberal in the traditional sense and more 
vocational in orientation and more instrumental in value with a shift from qualitative to 
quantitative measures of achievement. There is a clear emphasis on the numerical 
quantification of educational value and success. Such neo-liberal agendas have expanded 
what are called ‘education markets’ by employing market principles across the school 
system. These principles are now at the heart of English education policy and are essentially 
about the commodification of all aspects of education provision. As Ball (2012: 4) says: 
‘education policy is being ‘done’ in new locations, on different scales, by new actors and 
organisations’. State schooling is no longer a public sector monopoly. 
The policy results of such neo-liberal approaches in the English education system are far 
reaching in scope. Schools have been converted into academies run by private academy 
chains independent of local democratic control. Effectively private groups (currently not for 
profit) have taken over the running of schools which become charities with separate legal 
entities. These academies are free to set their own curriculum – they do not have to follow the 
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National Curriculum or an Agreed Syllabus for religious education. They also do not have to 
employ qualified teachers. They can set their own pay rates for teachers and incentivise 
teacher performance through bonuses. The position of governors is strengthened and most 
importantly these governing bodies are free from national standards of financial management. 
Governors became responsible for outsourcing catering, counselling services, and special 
needs and these choice policies made by the governors have involved them in negotiating and 
agreeing commercial contracts. It has brought them directly into major financial decision-
making and indirectly influencing teacher appointments. Groups with specific religious 
agendas could also apply for the establishment of faith schools in an area – even if the area is 
already well provided for in school places. 
It could be argued that the net effect of these policies has been to break down the 
institutionalised interests of teachers, trade unions, and local democratic control mechanisms:  
anything that supports a public sector as part of the state-civil society social contract. The 
cumulative effect of all these policies is to weaken and disconnect local schools from the 
locally elected authority. Paradoxically, such policies appear to have increased central 
government control through a system of standards, testing and measuring watched over by 
the inspection regime of OFSTED. Government can also issue statutory regulations that seek 
to govern without specifying exactly what must be done. So while the Government claims 
that schools are being set free, the reality appears to be that there is increasing control over 
schools from the Department for Education.  
Extremism and Radicalisation  
Extremism and radicalisation are not illegal within a democracy. However, there is difficulty 
in understanding them fully because both words lack an objective or universally accepted 
definition. Something that is considered extreme or radical will inevitably depend on the 
shifting culture, time and context from which they are being judged. Normally something 
regarded as extreme is the opposite of what is considered to be ordinary, common or 
prevalent within society. Radicalisation can be viewed as a process by which someone adopts 
an extreme position, but it may not involve violent behaviour in support of the position 
adopted. Extremism therefore involves holding beliefs considered by the majority in society 
as being at odds with the core beliefs of the whole. Indeed, ‘extreme’ can be defined as 
holding a fixed set of views outside the norm that may prevent compromise and exclude other 
perspectives, but this is not illegal. Extremism can take different forms and be characteristic 
of an individual or manifested in an institution such as a school. The term ‘extremism’ is also 
not value neutral and certainly open to misinterpretation.  Ultimately, who is responsible for 
defining someone or some institution as ‘extremist’?   
Governments have been naturally concerned with the perceived growth of extremism among 
young people, particularly the process of becoming extreme (radicalisation) to the point of 
exhibiting violent behaviour. In 2008 the Government published it’s PREVENT strategy to 
combat people turning to extremism. This document, whilst not specifically intended for 
schools, sets out in Section 10 advice and guidance for schools to prevent extremism. Its 
purpose is to integrate youth into national life and to encourage schools to develop policy 
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statements on combatting extremism. It sets out essentially to encourage and persuade 
because the PREVENT strategy is not a statutory policy of government and many schools do 
not have anti-extremist statements on their websites. Phillips (2011), who reviewed how 
schools responded to PREVENT, makes clear that most of the schools he looked at were 
more concerned with social cohesion rather than with extremism. Of course parental 
education and beliefs, home ethos and many other variables play a part in radicalisation. Non-
school factors can lead to radicalisation and the question arises of how schools are to educate 
students who already hold and exhibit extreme views. However, extremism and radicalisation 
are not the monopoly of any single religion (see Juegensmeyer, 2003). It is worthy of note 
that more than 20 young Muslims from Birmingham have been prosecuted in terrorist trials 
and some attended the schools under investigation (2), although there is no evidence that the 
schools radicalised them. Schools are now expected to identify ‘extremism’, take steps to 
minimize ‘radicalisation’ and reduce the motivation to radicalise through ‘schooling’. In 
other words not simply prevent ‘extremism’, but to ‘de-radicalise’ children.       
The Muslim Community in Birmingham   
There are 2.5 million Muslims in Britain which represents 4% of the population. In the 
census of 2011 in Birmingham there were 234,000 Muslims in the City representing 22% of 
the population mainly residing in the east of the City making Birmingham the largest Muslim 
community in the UK. The majority of the Muslim population is derived from rural areas of 
northern Pakistan whose religion is embedded in traditional tribal or clan systems (see Abbas, 
2006 and Goodhart, 2013: 235f)). The community is socially conservative, but generally 
votes Labour in local and general elections. Muslims in this area are family orientated and 
look after their elderly as well as knowing who their neighbours are. In a survey of young 
Muslim attitudes to virtues (Arthur  et al., 2009: p.89) in the area of the ‘Trojan Horse’ 
inspections it was found that they subscribe to traditional virtues, such as loyalty, trust and 
honesty, which they exhibit to a greater extent than the non-Muslim population in the City. 
The Muslim community’s focus is largely local with an emphasis on religious faith, 
traditional family and community values. Much of this virtue positive response would not be 
out of step with the values of an older British generation. It can be difficult to see who better 
reflects traditional British culture and values, conservative Muslim communities or 
secularised materialist youth groups. However, many within the Muslim community live in 
an almost wholly Muslim world without much contact with outsiders, in effect a segregated 
area.   
The religious identity of Muslims in particular has been regarded as suspect by many in the 
press and wider society. It should be remembered that religious believers may appear 
extremist to hard line secular liberals; for a religious person who gives their overriding or 
total commitment to truth claims concerning transcendent reality may well be viewed as 
suspect. This is especially the case when one considers one’s faith to be the only true and 
final religion. Still, much of this perception of religious people is based on a lack of 
understanding. Lynn Davies (2008: 1), for example, says that: ‘formal education does little to 
prevent people joining extremist groups, or to enable young people critically to analyse 
fundamentalism’.  Her use of ‘fundamentalism’ ignores the fact that the very word has its 
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origin among hard line Protestants in 1920s America who were so named because of their 
opposition to the drift to liberalism in religious beliefs.  Muslims object to the use of this 
original Christian word in relation to their own religion (see Lewis, 1988: 117).  Davies 
(2008: 7) goes on to equate religion with extremism and says that: ‘‘human rights’ are both 
more direct and less dangerous than theist forms of the ‘ultimate good’’. She calls for a 
secular morality and a kind of ‘cultural secularity’ in schools (Davies, 2008). She even asserts 
that the more religious one is the more likely one is to be less tolerant of gay and lesbian 
people (Davies, 2009: 186). Davies appears to have a clear ideology – it may be called 
‘secular liberalism’ and it could also be said that she has what Habermas (2006:17) calls a 
‘narrow secular consciousness’ that is an ideological understanding of ‘secularity’ which 
excludes any contribution of religion, not just politically, but also philosophically, to society. 
She also provides practically no evidence to justify her claims which in effect treat religion as 
if it was a relic of pre-modern societies and no longer has any right to exist. For many in the 
West, Islam is often taken to represent the antithesis to conceptions of national identity and 
liberal secular lifestyles.  
Kadt (2013: 119f) has argued that many mainstream Muslims are convinced of their unique 
correctness and are unwilling to compromise and therefore reject ideas that underlie 
multicultural societies. In a study of Muslim elites, identified here as counsellors and 
community activists, Klausen (2007) found that 70 percent of them were ‘neo-orthodox’ – 
they regarded liberalism as anti-Islamic. Husain (2007) goes further and claims that many of 
the leaders in the Muslim community are barely distinguishable from British ‘Islamists’. 
Husain’s use of ‘Islamists’ in this context would suggest a form of extremism in mainstream 
clothing and increases the perception of Muslims as being a ‘suspect community’. British 
Muslims are more likely, it appears, than Muslims in other developed countries to place their 
religious allegiance before their national identity. Eighty-one percent thought of themselves 
as Muslim first and British second, whilst the figures for France were 46 percent and 47 
percent for the United States of America. Policy Exchange in 2007 found that embracing 
their religious identity was even more pronounced among young Muslims in Britain. Feeling 
that one belongs to Britain was higher among the over 45 year olds than among the 18-24 
year olds. In summary, many Muslims regard their Islamic identity as the one identity that 
should dominate their lives. Nevertheless, it is important, as Mustafa (2015) says, to avoid 
simple stereotyping of Muslim communities and examine more deeply the key drivers of 
identity formation and political engagement.  
Is it possible that young Muslims are exaggerating their religiosity when questioned by 
pollsters? Some young British Muslims have sought networks outside of their school which 
offer them greater social solidarity and a clear narrative or world view which has led them to 
violent extremism. The Muslim community has typically responded by asserting that these 
young people have a distorted view of Islam (see Abbas, 2011), but is there an ‘authentic 
view’ of Islam? Are there ‘moderate’ Muslims? The response of the Islamic community is 
often to refer to suspected extremism as not representative of Islam. This response implies 
that there is an ‘authentic Islam’ to which the misrepresentation can be contrasted. This is not 
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a credible position and merely serves to foreclose debates about contentious political and 
cultural practices within some Muslim communities.   
The idea of the ‘moderate’ or ‘mainstream Muslim’ that can be trusted to run schools raises 
the question of how this phrase can be understood - politically or religiously. What is the 
definition of a moderate Muslim? It suggests different expressions of the Muslim faith – that 
there are different shades of Islam which together give the appearance of plurality. There are 
divisions among Muslims created by different generations, cultural, national and linguistic 
backgrounds that make it impossible to present the Muslim community as a unified body. 
There are some Muslims who refuse to accept difference and diversity; whilst others tolerate 
it. There are also some Muslims who want to re-anchor themselves in a particular traditional 
cultural version of Islam (see de Kadt, 2013: 124ff). In this latter group their first allegiance 
is to God and family while they are ambivalent about the State, viewing it as distant and 
impersonal. They do not recognise the State as the prime educator and are suspicious of 
government regulations that compel their children to participate in educational processes 
which they may question on good grounds. Muslim parents are not alone in questioning these 
processes in schools as many of Christian and Jewish faith share the concerns of Muslim 
parents about certain educational approaches and curriculum content. However, in a 
democratic society the promotion of exclusiveness and the imposition of viewpoints from any 
sectional interests are considered to be threatening to educational institutions.  
It was the Muslim leaders who commanded most respect and status within their religious 
communities that led the move to run local schools in Birmingham: their leadership was 
clearly associated with their religion and their version of Islam was generally conservative in 
orientation. The Muslim community in Birmingham appears to be organised around a 
hierarchical social and religious system within different groups. The general run of these 
communities will have highlighted their religious identity irrespective of their level of 
commitment to religious practice whilst giving support to Muslim leaders in running their 
local schools. They wanted Islam to be influential in schooling through Muslim prayers and 
to understand sex education from their religious perspective. The Government should have 
been aware of this context when it awarded the running of schools to these specifically male 
groups. Muslim children’s education and their non-Islamic schooling were worrying parents 
and Muslim leaders in the City. Many Muslim parents found themselves caught between two 
cultures – the home and the local school – and sought to bring the school into conformity 
with the ethos of the home. Their overriding concern was about the practice, continuation and 
transmission of the Muslim faith. As Ba-Yunus (2002) declares for a Muslim to live as a 
Muslim what is required is ‘an institutional environment’.  There was also a concern among 
parents about academic achievement and a desire that schools should increase levels of 
attainment. Many Muslim parents sincerely believed that religious values would aid academic 
attainment and such educational concerns were at the root of the crisis.  It is within this 
context of Muslim identity and concerns about schools failing their children that we might 
understand how these educational issues inspired the most passion, received the strongest 
reaction and widely varying media attention.  
The Trojan Horse Episode  
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The Trojan Horse affair concerned allegations in an anonymous letter in March 2014 that 
some schools in Birmingham were being taken over by a hard-line group of Muslims to 
impose a strict Islamic ethos. Many irrational anxieties about these Muslim majority schools 
were expressed in the press at the time. The Government-commissioned investigation into the 
schools by Sir Peter Clarke, neither sought nor found ‘evidence of terrorism, radicalisation, or 
violent extremism’ in the schools; it did however conclude that ‘there are a number of people, 
associated with each other and in positions of influence in schools and on governing bodies, 
who espouse, endorse, or fail to challenge extremist views.’ Twenty-one schools were 
inspected in Birmingham out of a total of 430 in the City. This comprised seven secondary, 
twelve primary, one primary/nursery and one nursery. All these schools are located in a 
socio-economically deprived area of the City.  
All the schools investigated had a majority Muslim student population, but none were faith 
schools.  There is a Muslim secondary voluntary aided school in the same area, Al Hijrah 
School (inspected 10/12/13), which was already in special measures after an earlier OFSTED 
inspection. It was known that the chair of governors of Al-Hijrah School had been employed 
as a consultant to one of the twenty-one schools investigated and that some governors of the 
twenty-one schools had been employed as consultants in the Al-Hijrah School. At the time of 
the inspections there existed malpractice, according to OFSTED, in this Muslim faith school, 
but it was not included in the Government or local council investigations. The school itself is 
overwhelmingly popular with Muslim parents and is one of the most oversubscribed schools 
in the UK. The school’s over-subscription indicates the desire of parents to retain traditional 
values and a sense of security in a disorientating world. More importantly, it indicates the 
level of cultural conservatism among Muslim parents in the area and the support for those 
who wish to provide institutions that reflect that conservatism. After the publication of the 
two main reports into the ‘Trojan Horse’ affair the local authority sought the removal of the 
governing body of this faith school on the grounds that the school had been alleged to have 
spent one million pounds on a school in Pakistan to further Islamic principles. The Muslim 
community have had particular difficulties running Muslim faith-based schools in Britain as 
the example of the Al Madinah School (inspected 3/12/14) in Derby testifies. The school was 
deemed ‘chaotic, dysfunctional and inadequate’ by OFSTED and was ordered to close its 
secondary provision by the Secretary of State in 2014.   
At the conclusion of the emergency OFSTED inspections in Birmingham no evidence of 
‘extremism’ was found, but five of the twenty-one schools were placed in special measures. 
These five schools were at the centre of the affair: three were academies run by the Park 
View Trust, which comprise two secondary, Park View (inspected 5 and 17/3/14) and Golden 
Hillock (inspected 2/4/14), and one primary, Nansen (2/4/14). The other two were Saltley 
(inspected 9/4/14), a local authority school, and Oldknow (inspected 7/4/14) a free-standing 
7-11 academy.     
Some have suggested that the OFSTED reports simply redefined extremism to equate with 
Muslim cultural conservatism (Miah, 2014). The Muslim Council of Britain put this by 
complaining that the reports were ‘conflating conservative Muslim practices to a supposed 
ideology and agenda to Islamise secular schools’. Subscribing to an ideology of course does 
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not mean you are extreme – it simply means you have come to some conclusions about how 
the world works at some basic level. It seems contradictory to say that religious faith can 
inform your conceptions of the cosmos and your place in it, morality and human purpose, but 
then to say that your religious faith should have nothing whatsoever to do with your decision 
making as a governor of a school. If you set schools free of local accountability then you are 
replacing the ethos of the local authority with some other political agenda.  Small numbers of 
governors were able to make significant changes to the schools without full consultation with 
parents and teachers because the system they found themselves in allowed this to happen; 
indeed they may claim that it encouraged them to make such decisions. The Kershaw report 
makes clear that many teachers felt that the schools had been pressurised to become 
academies by the Government and that the Department for Education failed to identify the 
risks to these schools in turning them into academies.  
Clarke found no evidence of terrorism, radicalisation or violent extremism in any of these 
schools, but he did find ‘conservative religious beliefs and behaviours’ among governors and 
some teachers. Kershaw found that some had ‘common ideological stance among key linked 
individuals’ and that some were promoting and encouraging certain Islamic principles. 
OFSTED reported from one school (Oldknow Academy OFSTED Report 7-8 April 2014 p.1) 
that ‘they [governors] are endeavouring to promote a particular and narrow based ideology in 
what is a maintained and non-faith academy’. No description of what was meant by a ‘narrow 
based ideology’ was provided in the report. It was reported in a number of schools that the 
Governors had exerted ‘inappropriate influence’ by manipulating appointments and not 
having a broad and balanced curriculum. But what is a broad and balanced curriculum to the 
Muslim governors when schools are told that they do not need to implement the National 
Curriculum or the Agreed Syllabus for religious education?  In the absence of any other 
curriculum guidelines the Governors made their own proposals. 
In the series of OFSTED reports published it was noted that the local authority did not 
monitor these schools well and that governors had bullied head teachers. A few schools had 
introduced a call to prayer and had posters in Arabic in classrooms advertising the virtue of 
prayer. Other schools taught Arabic and one had used school money to go on pilgrimage to 
Saudi Arabia. It was found that there was unequal treatment of girls, there was in one school 
anti-Christian chanting at assemblies whilst other schools were being dismissive of other 
faiths. This level of perceived intolerance was described in evidence to the Select Committee 
on Education (14
th
 October) by the Secretary of State for Education as ‘non-violent 
extremism’.  
However, it is important to look more closely at these findings in the OFSTED reports to 
understand to what extent they can be considered ‘extreme’. First, all the Muslim majority 
schools within the ‘Trojan Horse’ affair could seek a ‘determination’ from the Local 
Authority Standing Advisory Committee for Religious Education (SACRE) which would 
allow the daily act of worship and religious education to reflect the predominant major world 
faith in the school. In schools with over 95 percent of the students belonging to the Muslim 
faith holding a collective worship assembly that was mainly or wholly Christian would have 
seemed odd if not objectionable. Most of the schools in the Trojan Horse case had previously 
9 
 
sought a ‘determination’ although at the time of the inspections most of these 
‘determinations’ had expired and some schools had not requested an extension (Education 
Funding Agency, 2014). The Education Funding Agency report on the Park View Trust – the 
trust that ran three of the twenty-one schools under investigation found that the Trust itself 
had an Islamic focus even though none of the schools it ran were faith designated. Did the 
Department for Education not know this when it authorised the trust to run the schools? The 
point is clear that these schools, whilst non-faith, had been authorised at different times to 
have assemblies, collective worship and religious education in line with the Islamic faith. 
This would inevitably influence the ethos of these schools along Islamic lines and was in no 
way illegal. What is key here is that for those schools at the heart of the ‘Trojan Horse’ affair 
the authority to make a ‘determination’ was removed from SACRE and given to the Secretary 
of State for Education who made no determinations nor enquired into what was happening in 
Muslim majority schools in regard to collective worship and religious education. It suggests a 
lack of scrutiny from the centre and is another example of neo-liberal policies that freed 
schools from the established requirements of the law to provide an agreed syllabus based on 
moderation and consensus. The Department for Education did not take seriously the 
collective worship and religious education responsibilities it had acquired. Felderhof (2014) 
goes so far to say this was a subversion of the carefully crafted education laws built up over a 
century.   
Second, the teaching of Arabic was entirely at the discretion of the governors and other 
schools teach Arabic without this being particularly noted in an inspection report. Posters 
extolling the virtue of prayer in Arabic would not be unusual in a school that allows Islamic 
assemblies and indeed reflects the religious background of the children. School visits are also 
common and one such visit to Mecca in Saudi Arabia may reflect the interests of the school 
community rather than opting for a skiing trip to Switzerland or indeed a visit to Rome by 
another school. The use of funds is also regularly used by schools to subsidise school visits. 
The fact that OFSTED inspection reports commented on these activities without placing them 
within the broader ethos of the schools is problematic and may be interpreted as inspectors 
looking for reasons to paint a poor picture of these schools. The net effect was to feed press 
speculation about perceived ‘extremism’ associated with schools comprising a majority of 
Muslim students. It perhaps even helped facilitate the construction of the Birmingham 
Muslim population as a ‘suspect community’ or even the ‘enemy within’.  
It is true that serious elements of intolerance and poor leadership were found in a few schools 
and that girls were separated from boys in some classes. However, separation of sexes itself 
is not evidence of extremist tendencies; though it may in some contexts be evidence of 
objectionable sexist attitudes. The worldview of many in British education is affected by the 
strong ethos of secularity in British society that excludes or side-lines religious concepts and 
discourses/practices in maintained non-faith schools. However, highlighting specific 
examples of language teaching, choice of school visits and some separation in classes by sex 
hardly represents ‘non-violent extremism’.  The House of Commons Select Committee on 
Education (11
th
 March 2015) concluded that the ‘overlapping inquiries contributed to a sense 
of crisis and confusion’ and was critical of the DfE involvement.       
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British Values in Education   
The Government imposed new policies in the wake of the ‘Trojan Horse’ affair including no-
notice OFSTED inspections and the promotion of ‘fundamental British values’.  As early as 
2002 the Labour Government proposed a statement of values setting out what binds British 
people together. David Cameron in Munich in 2011 spoke about the values of democracy, 
rule of law, freedom of speech, equal rights and freedom of religion and said that these define 
us as a society and that ‘to belong here is to believe in these things’. There has been much 
thought about what Britishness means and the process of defining and redefining British 
values has been given renewed energy by the Department for Education insisting that schools 
must promote ‘British values’. Immediately following the ‘Trojan Horse’ affair the 
Government issued guidance on promoting British values in schools  – all have a duty to 
‘actively promote’ the fundamental British values.  Some have, in opposition to this new 
educational requirement, quoted Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights which is binding on Britain and asserts that minorities must not be denied 
their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion or to use their own language (see 
Thomas, 2010). They also quote from the Denham Report issued by the Home Office in 2002 
(p20) which said that ‘There is no single dominant and unchanging culture into which all 
must assimilate’. Cantle (2001: 10) in contrast asserted that a ‘greater sense of citizenship’ 
informed by ‘common elements of nationhood’ is needed. His emphasis was on 
commonality, cohesion and integration, but in the end much of this is based on entertainment, 
consumption and expressive culture – he largely ignored religion.  
Meer and Modood (2009) and Modood (2007) have commented on successive governments’ 
integration attempts as being explicitly secular in approach stressing ‘lifestyle and 
consumption-based behavioural identities that are anti-essentialist in orientation and which 
invalidate ‘group’ identities in particular’. Muslims who wish to assert their own identity are 
categorised as self-segregating, adopting isolationist practices, and accused of contravening 
liberal secular discourses on individual rights. Many Muslims find it difficult to embrace 
British values if they are equated exclusively with secular interpretations. This might be 
worrying to some secularists as Caldwell (2009: 286) observed ‘When an insecure, malleable, 
relativistic culture meets a culture that is anchored, confident, and strengthened by common 
doctrines, it is generally the former that changes to suit the latter’. Many within the Muslim 
community had given assent to the Agreed Syllabus on religious education in the City of 
Birmingham and much of the content of this syllabus is in many ways stronger than the 
confusion in interpretations currently being promoted by British values. Hand (2011:35) has 
argued that ‘patriotism’ ought to be taught in schools as a controversial issue, it may be that 
the only defensible approach to teaching British values is to view and teach it as 
controversial.   
The introduction of ‘British values’ has created a degree of confusion between different 
senses or interpretations of the phrase. The main source of confusion seems to be between 
'cultural values' and 'political values'. There are clearly locally diverse British cultural 
customs and practices in the sense of fish and chips, cricket, kilts, Morris dancing and 
greyhound racing which are almost certainly distinguishable from, also culturally diverse, 
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Muslim customs and practices such as daily prayer, segregation of the sexes or burqa 
wearing. But it is not, at least generally, these to which people are objecting when they claim 
Islam is at odds with British values. Rather, what they are objecting to is perceptions that 
Islam seems often opposed to Western rather than specifically British liberal-democratic 
principles of respect and tolerance for the rights and beliefs of others who do not share their 
own. It is a political culture that they have in mind rather than a culture of native customs and 
practices. There is evidence that at least some Muslims would want to reject, or if possible 
destroy, the Western political culture and values of liberal-democratic respect and tolerance, 
precisely in the name of Islam. Core political values are shared convictions about what is 
important in society, but it does not require that all adopt the same political perspectives. The 
key value in this core is political tolerance which is a fair and permissive attitude to those 
whose opinions and practices differ from one’s own.   
This confusion about British values is increased because western liberal-democracy tends to 
be confused with secularism. This makes it look as though the issue is between the secular 
West and the religious East. But one can be a committed Muslim and a committed liberal 
democrat. But confusion is also compounded by the fact that many secular and religious 
political liberals find some Islamic cultural customs and practices, such as arranged 
marriages, objectionable and much at odds with fundamental liberal democratic justice and 
rights. They reject intolerant cultural practices that violate equal rights of others, including 
‘others’ from within the Muslim community. The coercion of children or adults through the 
closure of choice and opportunities to learn in the name of religion is not a value that a 
democratic society upholds.      
Consequently, without any consultation with the public far less a consensus about what these 
fundamental British values meant OFSTED inspectors began a programme of unannounced 
inspections.  
OFSTED 
In 2014 changes were introduced to the way OFSTED was to inspect schools in future. A 
greater focus on the governance of schools was given new emphasis in inspections.  OFSTED 
inspectors will now consider whether governors ensure that ‘they and the school promote 
tolerance of and respect for people of all faiths (or those of no faith), cultures and lifestyles; 
and support and help, through their words, actions and influence within the school and more 
widely in the community, to prepare children and young people positively for life in modern 
Britain’.  The pre April 2014 version of the Handbook for Inspection made no reference to 
preventing or identifying extremism in schools. By September 2014 OFSTED had changed 
the inspection criteria to promoting tolerance, respect for people of other faiths, cultures and 
lifestyles and to prepare young people positively for life in Britain. There was also a new 
focus on the role of governors. It might reasonably be asked why had OFSTED not 
discovered any of the problems with governors in previous inspections?  Some of the schools 
had been graded outstanding just months before they were re-graded inadequate. An 
observation not lost on the Commons Select Committee which noted that OFSTED was 
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unable to identify problems at Birmingham schools on first inspection and that ‘Confidence 
in OFSTED has been undermined’ as a consequence (see Select Committee, 2015).  
No-notice inspections were introduced and some of the first inspections were focused on faith 
schools with surprising results.  St Benedict’s in Bury St Edmunds’s is a Catholic secondary 
school that was downgraded because the inspectors from OFSTED believed the school did 
not prepare students for the dangers of extremism and radicalisation. The school in the 
opinion of the inspectors had failed to uphold British values under the new regulations. The 
result caused considerable disquiet and many MPs approached the Secretary of State to 
complain about OFSTED inspectors acting beyond their remit. OFSTED was forced to revise 
its report on the school and made no reference in the second version to the ‘dangers’ it raised 
in the first version. In another inspection of a faith school – the Beis Yaakov High School for 
Girls, a secondary Orthodox Jewish School in London, the inspectors downgraded the school 
from outstanding because they believed the school did not satisfy the Equalities Act 2010 
which is mentioned in the new regulations by not ‘actively promoting’ British values. 
Inspectors questioned the girls on whether they knew any gay people and whether they had a 
boyfriend and whether they had friends from other religions. Some believe that the very 
nature of these questions is extreme and that OFSTED was not respecting the religious ethos 
of faith schools, indeed that these inspections were antithetical to their faith and undermined 
the whole basis of faith schools. Some would go further and suggest that inspectors were 
trying to impose a secular worldview that challenged the religious commitment of believing 
children.  
In another faith-based school, Trinity School in Reading, which is an independent Christian 
School, OFSTED inspected the school only11 months after the previous inspection and 
downgraded the school for not bringing in a local Imam to demonstrate compliance with the 
new regulations. In Grindon Hall Christian School the inspectors found that there was a ‘lack 
of respect and tolerance for those who belong to different faiths, cultures and communities’ 
and graded the school inadequate even though it had the best examination results in the area. 
These comments by inspectors are similar to the comments made about the ‘Trojan Horse’ 
schools in Birmingham, but there is a major difference. The Christian schools are all legally 
obliged to promote Christian principles and are not maintained schools expected to support 
diverse religious groups.   
OFSTED had essentially become arbitrary and ad hoc in what it defined as non-compliance 
with the British values criteria. There was a tendency to equate failure to promote British 
values with a failure to identify ‘extremism’. What is it that is required of Muslim 
communities or any other religious school? Is it to simply obey the law? In this context it 
might be noted that the Secretary of State had to clarify the regulations on British values in 
that faith schools simply had to respect gay people and need not support or endorse marriage 
of same sex couples. This has led to confusion and contradiction. The Government and its 
inspection regime proved inadequate in monitoring the effectiveness and risks contained in 
implementing neo-liberal policies.  Eventual blame for malpractice in Birmingham schools 
was placed on governors with government policies and OFSTED inspections escaping 
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responsibility. In the process ‘extremism’ became loosely defined and inspections lost a 
degree of credibility by the active promotion of fundamental British values.  
The 2015 Counter-Terrorism and Security Act has placed a number of legal obligations on 
schools and set up a series of duties and expectations on teachers. Schools and teachers have 
a clear legal duty not only to challenge extremist views, but also to prevent young people 
being drawn to extremism. School governors are required to ensure that their schools work 
with local authorities and participate in inter-agency safeguarding of children. The Act also 
requires schools to train staff in recognising extremism and to produce policies on internet 
filtering and the use of prayer rooms on school premises. The law has a tougher and more 
rigorous set of expectations of schools and OFSTED will be inspecting these requirements.  
Conclusion  
Neo-liberal education policies have changed education policy and practice in England, but 
the lessons from the ‘Trojan Horse’ affair in Birmingham suggest that these policies have 
their limits. The Government’s academies and free schools programme awarded school 
governors freedoms from local authority control and from national guidelines. Were these 
new freedoms exploited by some for ideological reasons or were the levels of 
mismanagement and incompetence that were unveiled simply side effects of these policies? It 
needs to be recognised that malpractice has been unveiled in other academies and free 
schools. The Public Accounts Committee produced a report in May 2014 indicating concerns 
about financial management in a number of free schools and the report outlined the risks to 
good management. Three of these free schools had already failed on account of their 
malpractice and incompetence and were closed, but none were considered to have been 
‘extreme’ in any way. The quality of leadership and management was inadequate in these 
schools in the same way as some of the ‘Trojan Horse’ schools. It would appear that many of 
the governors who ran these schools had not been trained to secure the development of good 
governance nor were they trained in good appointment and employment procedures or even 
the proper use of public funds. What due scrutiny did the Government carry out on these 
individuals to whom it awarded millions of pounds of public money to run schools?    
The poor governance and leadership in the schools that led to serious malpractice was 
attributed largely to the governors, but was not discovered by OFSTED until 2014 when it 
entered the schools with a new agenda. Although in a somewhat contradictory note, Clarke 
commented in his report that he had seen no evidence to suggest a problem with governance 
generally. The neo-liberalisation of education has had consequences for the governing of 
schooling producing negative outcomes together with a set of contradictions and paradoxes. 
At best one could say that these neo-liberal policies had unintended consequences for the 
schools in Birmingham. It is interesting that an internal review by Chris Wormwald (2015) at 
the Department for Education into the Department’s handling of the ‘Trojan Horse’ affair 
found that the DfE did not act ‘inappropriately’. Nevertheless, it was recognised that 
complaints had been received about Muslim influence on non-faith designated schools. The 
DfE has now strengthened its unit on extremism in schools. However, the weaknesses 
discovered in the governing system in some Muslim majority schools in Birmingham have 
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been partly caused by neo-liberal education policies. Local authority monitoring was largely 
absent because there oversight powers were removed depriving the local authority of 
resources and senior leadership to monitor and make schools accountable. It should be noted 
that the local authority in Birmingham did act previously to remove governors of Moseley 
School for not dissimilar issues that arose in the ‘Trojan Horse’ affair. Governors of the 
academy schools were now given control of finances and appointments with different 
interests and a different vision of education. There was simply non-existent local 
accountability of the governors and interestingly OFSTED inspections up until 2014 
repeatedly graded these schools good to outstanding, even in their governance and 
management.  
It is also to be observed that many educational progressives appear to support and are in 
alliance with conservative Muslims whilst simultaneously promoting ideas of ‘diversity’, 
‘human rights’ and ‘tolerance’. These liberal notions often collide with the lesser rights some 
minorities assign to women, gay and lesbian people which they consider oppressive practices. 
There is also a tendency for liberal minded educationalists to believe that religious ideas are 
largely irrelevant to education and they look for explanations of extremism in grievances 
such as poverty, poor housing or discrimination rather than in ideology. The debate about 
Muslim majority schools has become polarised: either issues are viewed through the lens of 
extremism or any criticism of Islamic influence on public education is seen as Islamophobic. 
Two schools of thought are clearly present in the debates around extremism: one seeks to 
address grievances whilst the other seeks to deal with the underlining ideology. The role of 
religion is crucial in these widening divisions and the role of government in allowing self-
appointed ‘leaders’ of Islam to run schools. OFSTED has also gone beyond the regulations 
allowing varying interpretations of inspectors who then go on to inspect and measure 
compliance to these interpretations. OFSTED has found itself to be the sole arbiter of what 
constitutes extremism which has called its credibility into question.  
Whilst pluralism demands that religion be given space in the public education realm (non-
faith designated schools) it should be recognised that secular education is neither value free 
nor neutral and can be indifferent or hostile to religious notions in educational practice. 
Liberal progressives in education often have difficulty grasping the ‘binding’ moral and 
religious concerns that engage religious people and too easily judge them as ‘not 
mainstream’. The law allows State schools the freedom to promote particular worship and 
religious education and therefore the Government and its inspection agency has no authority 
in law to aim at the creation of a secular public consciousness in schooling. It cannot function 
to undercut religious loyalties and advance non-theistic belief systems. There appears to be an 
uncontested acceptance of the idea that the State should control the educative process for all 
except for the most privileged. The Muslim community in Birmingham sought from their 
local schools higher academic attainment, the preservation of their faith and some kind of 





(1) This paper is partially based on a review of the 21 OFSTED reports linked directly to the 
Trojan Horse affair in Birmingham. A full list of these schools and their inspection 
dates/reports are contained in a letter of the Chief Inspector of Schools to the Secretary of 
State for Education dated 9
th
 June 2014. The article also uses the OFSTED Inspection 
Handbooks, particularly the revised issue of April 2014.   
(2) Birmingham Mail 4
th
 May 2013 reported that Birmingham had become a byword for 
Islamic extremist terror and the article gives profiles of the Birmingham Muslim men who 
have been convicted of terror offences including the alleged Saudi financier of the 9/11 
attacks, the first suicide bomber in Britain and the country’s first Al Qaida terror plotter.   
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